We propose and analyze an interleaved variant of Loidreau's rank-metric cryptosystem based on rank multipliers. We analyze and adapt several attacks on the system, propose design rules, and study weak keys. Finding secure instances requires near-MRD rank-metric codes which are not investigated in the literature. Thus, we propose a random code construction that makes use of the fact that short random codes over large fields are MRD with high probability. We derive an upper bound on the decryption failure rate and give example parameters for potential key size reduction.
In this paper, we combine the ideas of the interleaved system in [2] with Loidreau's GPT variant [14] . We show that in principle, Loidreau's system can be interleaved using classical decoders for interleaved Gabidulin codes. We also analyze the security of the new system, including an adaption of Tillich's attack to the rank metric. Similar to [4] , we describe how Tillich's attack can be prevented by choosing the error matrix in a suitable way. It turns out that the construction of (in this sense) secure errors requires rank-metric codes whose minimum distances are close to the Singleton bound. We show that Gabidulin codes yield potentially insecure error patterns since the resulting error matrix can be distinguished from a random one. We further show that depending on the parameters, one can draw the error matrix in a random way and fulfill the requirements with high probability. For this choice of the error, we derive upper bounds on the decryption failure and present secure parameter sets that demonstrate the potential key size reduction.
I I . P R E L I M I N A R I E S

A. Notations
Let q be a power of a prime and let F q denote the finite field of order q and F q m its extension field of order q m . We use F m×n q to denote the set of all m × n matrices over F q and F n q m = F 1×n q m for the set of all row vectors of length n over F q m . Rows and columns of m × n-matrices are indexed by 1, . . . , m and 1, . . . , n, where A i,j is the element in the i-th row and j-th column of the matrix A . Denote the set of integers [a, b] = {i : a ≤ i ≤ b}. By rk q (A) and rk q m (A), we denote the rank of a matrix A over F q , respectively F q m .
For any i, we denote the q-power by [i] := q i . Let γ = γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ m be an ordered basis of F q m over F q . By utilizing the vector space isomorphism F q m ∼ = F m q , we can relate each vector a ∈ F n q m to a matrix A ∈ F m×n q according to ext γ : F n q m → F m×n q , a = a 1 , . . . , a n → A, where a j = m i=1 A i,j γ i , ∀j ∈ [1, n] . Further, we extend the definition of ext γ to matrices by extending each row and then vertically concatenating the resulting matrices.
For a field F, the vector space that is spanned by
The vector space that is spanned by the rows of the matrix A ∈ F m×n is denoted by R A , i.e., R A = A 1,1 , . . . , A 1,n , . . . , A m,1 , . . . , A 1m,n F . The set of all n × n matrices which have only entries from V is denoted by M n (V), i.e., M n (V) = {A ∈ F n×n q m : A i,j ∈ V}.
The product space of the subspaces A and B is denoted by A × B.
B. Rank-Metric, Gabidulin and Interleaved Gabidulin Codes
The rank norm rk q (a) is the rank of the matrix representation A ∈ F m×n q over F q . The rank distance between a and b is d R (a, b) := rk q (a − b) = rk q (A − B). An [n, k, d] linear code C over F q m is a k-dimensional subspace of F n q m and minimum rank distance d, i.e, d := min a∈C\{0} {rk q (a)}.
Gabidulin codes [22] - [24] are a class of rank-metric codes.
Definition 1 (Gabidulin Code). A Gabidulin code G(n, k) over F q m of length n ≤ m and dimension k is defined by its k × n generator matrix
. . , g n ] ∈ F n q m , rk q (g) = n. In [23] , it is shown that Gabidulin codes are MRD codes, i.e., d = n − k + 1, and can be decoded uniquely up to t ≤ d−1
2
. Interleaved Gabidulin codes are a code class for which efficient decoders are known that are able to correct t ≤ +1 (n − k) errors 1 with high probability, cf. [25] - [27] . Definition 2 (Interleaved Gabidulin Codes [25] ). An interleaved Gabidulin code IG( ; n, k) over F q m of length n ≤ m, dimension k ≤ n, and interleaving order is defined by
C. Difficult Problems in Rank Metric
In this section, we state difficult variants of the rank syndrome decoding (RSD) problem which can used for cryptography.
Definition 3 (RSD Distribution). Input: q, n, k, w, m Choose uniformly at random
Definition 4 (Search RSD Problem). Input: (H, y ) from the RSD Distribution Goal: Find x ∈ {a ∈ F n q m : rk q (a) = w} such that Hx = y Note that the Syndrome Decoding Problem in Hamming Metric can be probabilistically reduced to Search RSD problem [28] . Goal: Find X ∈ {B ∈ F n q m : rk q (B) = w} such that HX = Y Note that the Interleaved Search RSD problem is similar to the problem proposed in [29, Definition 7] . The only difference is that the rows of the matrix X in Interleaved RSD Distribution have the same row space whereas the rows of U in [29, Definition 7] have the same column space. For a small interleaving order , the currently most efficient algorithm to solve both, the Interleaved Search RSD Problem and the problem given in [29, Definition 7] , was presented in [3] and will be analyzed in Section IV. For a high interleaving order ≥ w, the algorithm proposed in [30] is able to solve the Interleaved Search RSD Problem with high probability in polynomial time. For an interleaving order greater than wk, the algorithm proposed in [31] is able to efficiently solve [29, Definition 7] , see [31, Section 6.5] .
The system that we propose is a McEliece-type system based on interleaving the rank-metric codes introduced in [14] .
To prove that decryption of the proposed system is successful with high probability, we need the following lemma.
The proof is similar to [14] . Let γ = γ 1 , . . . , γ be an ordered basis of F q m over F q m , e = e 1 , . . . , e n := ext −1 γ (E) ∈ F n q m be of rank weight t, and e 1 , . . . , e n Fq = 1 , . . . , t Fq . Further, let ν 1 , . . . , ν λ be a basis of V. The entries of the vector eP belong to the vector
The system parameters are shown in Table I . The key generation, encryption and decryption algorithms are as follows.
A. Key Generation
The keys are the same as in [14] , i.e., • G ∈ F k×n q m a generator matrix of a random G(n, k),
The public key is given by
Assuming G pub cannot be distinguished from a random matrix 2 , an attacker needs to generically decode the cipher to obtain the plain text. This is equal to solving the Interleaved Search RSD Problem.
We recall, analyze, and adapt known attacks on the systems in [2] , [14] . Since the keys are the same as in [14] , key attacks are as hard as on the system in [14] .
1) (key attack): In [14] , a structural attack is described, which is based on brute-forcing a number of (λ − 1)dimensional subspaces of F m q . The work factor is given by 3
2) (decoding attack): The work factors 3 of the algorithms that correct errors of rank t in an arbitrary [n, k] linear rank distance code over F q m are denoted by WF Cha (t) [33] , WF Our [34] , WF Gab (t) [35] and WF Ara (t) [36] .
Tillich [3] proposed an attack on the interleaved Goppa codes system in [2] , which can be similarly applied here. The augmented matrix of the public key and the cipher
has the same row
where d E is the minimum rank distance of an error code spanned by the rows of E, i.e., C E [n, , d E ] := R E . Due to the restriction on the error matrix E in (1), finding some non-zero element of the error code can, at least partially, recover the row space of the extended error matrix ext γ (E) ∈ F m ×n q since R ext γ (E) = R ext γ (e 1 ) + · · · + R ext γ (e ) . The problem of finding low-rank-weight words was studied in [37] , and is in principle equivalent to rank syndrome decoding. In particular, it has a similar complexity if the weight of the low-weight words is as large as the error in rank syndrome decoding, i.e., the smallest-known work factor is
Note that since each row of Y is a codeword corrupted by an error of rank at least d E , the row-wise rank syndrome decoding has a complexity of at least WF E . Further, this attack has a higher complexity than generic decoding in Loidreau's original system with the same public key if and
, a polynomial-time decoding algorithm is proposed that works for arbitrary interleaved codes of interleaving degree ≥ t pub and error matrices of full rank. However in case of < t pub , one must brute-force through the solution space of a linear system of equations, whose size is exponential in m(t pub − ). By choosing the parameters according to Table I , this attack is not efficient.
V. C O N S T R U C T I O N O F T H E E R R O R M AT R I X
We have seen in the previous section that in order to resist Tillich's attack, the rows of the error matrix E must span a code of large minimum rank distance, i.e., E must be a generator matrix of an [n, , d E > d−1 2 ] code. The following statement shows how to construct such a code that still fulfills the decoding condition (1), which is necessary for successful decryption.
Theorem 2. Let the error matrix be given by
is a generator matrix of a [t pub , , d E ] code and has full F q -rank and B ∈ F t pub ×n q has full rank. Then, E fulfills (1) and is a generator matrix of an [n, , d E ] code. Also, E and any row of E has F q -rank at least d E .
Proof: Since A has t pub columns, its F q -rank is at most t pub . Multiplication by the full-rank F q -matrix B from the right does not change the F q -rank, so rk q (E) ≤ t pub and (1) is satisfied.
To prove that the error matrix spans an [n, , d E ] code, we first observe that the length of vectors in the row space of E is n and its F q m -rank is (since A has full F q m -rank and multiplication by the full-rank matrix B does not change this rank). Thus it is a code of length n and dimension over F q m .
As for the minimum distance, we have the following. Let c 1 , c 2 ∈ F n q m be two distinct vectors in the row space of E. Then, we can write them as c i = a i ·B, where a 1 , a 2 ∈ F t pub q m are in the row space of A. Since the c i are distinct, so are the a i . Furthermore, we have d R (a 1 , a 2 ) ≥ d E . Since B is a full-rank matrix over F q , multiplication by it does not change the rank of a word. Hence, d R (c 1 , c 2 ) = d R (a 1 B, a 2 B) = d R (a 1 , a 2 ) ≥ d E , which shows that the rows of E indeed generate an [n, , d E ] code. As a result, any row of E, as well as E itself, has F q -rank d E .
Due to the rank-metric Singleton bound, the minimum distance of the error code is upper bounded by d E ≤ t pub − +1. The work factor of [3] is greater than RSD of Loidreau's system if d E > d−1 2λ . To gain in security level (or to reduce the key size), we must choose a suitable [t pub , , d E ] code with
An obvious choice would be a Gabidulin code attaining the upper bound. However, we will show in Appendix A that in this case, the error code R E can be distinguished from a random code, which might be a weakness.
In the next section, we will show that it suffices to choose a random code as the error code since its minimum distance attains the upper bound in (3) with high probability, cf. [38] .
As an alternative, one can use structured codes that arise from codes whose minimum distance is close to the upper bound. However, such codes have not been studied in the literature and, hence, this paper provides a motivation to study these codes. We will formally state the research problem in the conclusion. 
In this section, we show that by choosing A uniformly at random among all full-rank matrices in F ×t pub q m , one obtains an [n, , t pub − + 1] error code with high probability. For this choice of A, we then analyze the decryption failure probability.
A. Probability of E Generating an [n, , t pub − + 1] Code Theorem 3 (Probabilities for MRD codes [38] ). Let X ∈ F k×(n−k) q m be randomly chosen. Then
where I k denotes the k × k identity matrix.
Note that for practical parameters, it might not be feasible to determine the minimum rank distance of the chosen code since the fastest-known algorithms to compute the minimum rank distance are exponential in the code parameters. Then the probability that E is a generator matrix of a [n, , t pub − + 1] code is ≥ 1 − q t pub −m .
Proof: It follows directly from Theorems 2 and 3. Note that if the inverse of the probability that A is not MRD, i.e., −1 q m− t pub , is above the security level, this choice of the error does not decrease the security of the system. We take this into account for the choice of the proposed parameters and show the values in Table II .
B. Decryption Failure Probability
The decryption algorithm fails if and only if the decoding of the interleaved Gabidulin code fails. 
Proof: The error that has to be decoded during decryption can be written asẼP = A B , where the
Since dim( A i,1 , . . . , A i,t pub Fq × V) = λt pub andB is random, the matrix B can be seen as random element of F λt pub ×n q and (EP ) i,j as random element of A i,1 , . . . , A i,t pub Fq ×V, see [39, Proposition 4.3] . Thus, when applying the interleaved decoder proposed in [25] , [40] , the probability of correcting EP successfully is
Further since rk q (A ) = λt pub , the probability Pr[rk Fq (ẼP ) = t ] is equal to the probability that the random matrix B has rank t [39, Proposition 4.3], i.e.,
Note that the error in Theorem 6 is not necessary fullrank. However, it seems possible to adapt the proof of the bound in [25] , [40] to random full-rank errors, where we conjecture that the lower bound on the success probability will be higher in case of full-rank errors. Based on this conjecture the decryption algorithm in Section III fails with probability
We believe that the latter bound on the decryption failure is not tight since 1) dim( A i,1 , . . . , A i,t pub Fq × V) = λt pub is not a necessary condition to successfully decode but only required for the correctness of Theorem 6 and 2) the bound was derived for EP that might not have full rank. Nevertheless, for the parameters proposed in Table II , even the inverse of this loose upper bound on the decryption failure rate is below the claimed security levels.
V I I . P O T E N T I A L K E Y S I Z E R E D U C T I O N
For the error construction proposed in Proposition 4, we propose parameters for (post-quantum) levels of security of 80, 128, 196 and 256 bit with respect to the known attacks in Table II . The explicit work factors, the inverse of the probability that A is not MRD denoted by WF A := log 2 −1 q m− t pub , the rate k/n, the key size q k(n−k) and the upper bound on the decryption failure P f in bits are presented for d E = t pub − + 1.
V I I I . C O N C L U S I O N In this paper, we proposed a rank-metric McEliece-type cryptosystem based on applying the interleaving approach of Elleuch et al. on Loidreau's cryptosystem. We analyzed possible attacks and showed that structural attacks are as hard as for Loidreau's system but an additional decoding attack is facilitated by interleaving. The efficiency of the latter attack can be reduced by choosing the error matrix as a generator matrix of a code with large minimum distance. We suggested design rules of the system and proved that depending on the parameters, a random construction of the error matrix fulfills the requirements with high probability. For this choice of the error, we derived upper bounds on the decryption failure and presented valid parameter sets that permit to decrease the key sizes.
Related Open Research Problem
Note that (3) does not restrict the code generated by A to be MRD but also allows codes whose minimum distances are close to t pub − + 1. Since only little is known about non-MRD codes, the cryptosystem proposed here gives motivation to an interesting new research direction:
Open Research Problem 1. Given an extension field F q m , n ≤ m, k < n, and d = n − k + 1 − ε, for some ε ∈ N, ε n − k, find a rank-metric code with parameters [n, k, d] over F q m with efficient decoder, which-vaguely stated-cannot be distinguished from a random rank-metric code as easily as a Gabidulin code (cf. Appendix) below). A P P E N D I X In this section, we show that choosing A ∈ F ×t pub q m (cf. Theorem 2) to be a generator matrix of a Gabidulin code, results in an error code (i.e., the code spanned by the rows of E ∈ F ×n q m ) that is distinguishable from a random error matrix. Although this does not directly lead to an explicit attack, which e.g., recovers the error matrix, this might be a weakness of ciphers obtained from these A.
We use the fact that the augmented matrix obtained by vertically concatenating G pub and the cipher Y , has the same row space as the same construction with G pub and the unknown error E, i.e., R G Y aug = R G E aug . Thus, the augmented matrix might reveal the structure of the error matrix E by applying the following operator to it, as we will see in the following.
Definition 7 (q-Sum). Let C[n, k] be a linear code over F q m and i ∈ N 0 . Then, the (i th ) q-sum of C is defined by
A. Distinguishing the Augmented Code
We first state the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Let E be constructed as in Theorem 2, where A is a generator matrix of a Gabidulin code. Then, dim(Λ i (C aug )) ≤ min{(i + 1)k + min{ + i, t pub }, n}.
Proof: By definition Λ i (C aug ) = Λ i (R G pub ) + Λ i (C E ). Since A is a generator matrix of a [t pub , k] Gabidulin code, dim(Λ i (C E )) = min{ + i, t pub }. Thus, dim(Λi(Caug)) = min{dim(Λi(R G pub )) + min{ + i, t pub }, n} ≤ min{(i + 1)k + min{ + i, t pub }, n}.
If A in Theorem 2 is chosen to be a random full-rank matrix, we have dim Λ i (R E ) = min{(i + 1) , t pub } with high probability. Hence, by the same arguments as in Lemma 7, the overall augmented code has dimension dim(Λ i (C aug )) = min{dim(Λ i (R G pub )) + min{(i + 1) , t pub }, n} ≤ min{(i + 1)k + min{(i + 1) , t pub }, n}. By Lemma 7, for 2k + min{ + 1, t pub } < n (which simply means that for i > 0, min{(i+1)k+min{ +i, t pub }, n} < n), the dimension of Λ i (C aug ) with a Gabidulin code matrix A is smaller than the respective dimension when using a random A, with high probability. Hence, it can be distinguished.
B. Distinguishing the Dual Augmented Code
We study the dual of the augmented matrix.
Proof: For the code C ⊥ aug it holds that
where 0 i denotes the all-zero vector of length i.
Lemma 9.
There is an H E of the form
is of full rank and defined over F q , we can find a basis B ker ∈ F (n−t pub )×n q of its right kernel. Note that B ker has full F q -and F q m -rank. By the basis extension theorem, we can extend the linearly independent rows of B ker into a full basis of F n q . These further t pub basis element form the rows of B inv . Note that also B inv has full F q -and F q m -rank and any non-zero vector in the row space of B inv is linearly independent to the rows of B ker . Hence, also the rows of A ⊥ B inv are linearly independent of the rows of B ker , which, together with the fact that A ⊥ has full rank, shows that H E has full F q m -rank n − .
It remains to show that the rows of H E are in the right kernel of E. The rows of B ker fulfill this because E = AB and B ker is a basis of the right kernel of B. For the first t pub − rows of H E , we check:
which is true since A ⊥ B inv B is a parity-check matrix with respect to A.
Remark 10. Note that A ⊥ as in Lemma 9 is a generator matrix of a [t pub , t pub − ] Gabidulin code since A ⊥ B inv B is one (the dual code of a [t pub , ] Gabidulin code is a [t pub , t pub − ] Gabidulin code, cf. [23] ) and B inv B is an invertible matrix over F q (which means that we just need to use different evaluation points in the Gabidulin code). . Then, dim(Λ i (C ⊥ aug )) ≤ min{n − l + i, (i + 1)(n − k), n}. Proof: The proof follows directly by Lemmas 11, 12 and 13. In summary, by choosing A to be a generator matrix of a Gabidulin code, the error code E can be distinguished from an error matrix with random A. This does not imply an explicit attack on the system, but indicates that there might be a weakness in this case. The distinguisher must also be considered when constructing codes from Open Research Problem 1.
